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Abstract
This paper considers the effect of the introduction of the euro on the liquidity of European fixed
income markets. From the outset, the private money market in euros achieved unity, as evidenced by
the near identity of euro bank deposit rates within and without the euro area. Transactions in the euro’s
predecessor currencies’ money market futures point to liquidity in excess of that in the yen but less
than in the dollar while transactions in interest rate swaps point to liquidity in excess of that in the yen
or the dollar. The introduction of the euro appears to have accelerated the concentration of liquidity in
the futures markets in the German government bond, which show trading volumes in excess of that in
the US Treasury long bond. While this concentration brings a measure of integration to the euro
government bond market, the relatively narrow national base of deliverable bonds may leave the euro
area's premier duration-management tool particularly subject to squeezes. The disproportion of futures
and cash market may leave the euro government bond market less liquid than it might be otherwise.
* The views expressed are those of the author and should not be attributed to the BIS.1
1. Introduction
The introduction of a single money in Europe exerts a profound effect on the business of borrowing
and lending money. Looking across the various activities involved in this business, McCauley and
White (1997) argued that the introduction of the euro would have its most immediate impact on the
wholesale money market, interest rate swap markets and the government securities markets. All of
these markets look set to gain breadth, depth and liquidity, as further argued in McCauley (1998).
Just how much more liquid the European government bond market will prove to be is a point of
controversy. Euroland will not at its inception field a large federal borrower. Von Hagen argues that
budgetary constraints like the Stability and Growth Pact on lower levels of government—in this case
national—tend to divert demands for spending to the higher level—in this case the EU level. But for
the time being, there is neither a federal issuer nor joint and several liability among the governments of
Euroland. For some observers, this implies a thoroughly fragmented market along the lines of the US
market for state and local government debt (the somewhat misleadingly termed municipal bond
market). Other observers concede that the differences in creditworthiness of governments in Euroland
do matter but hold that a partially integrated bond market is likely. Even partial integration could boost
liquidity very substantially.
This paper seeks to demonstrate that interbank and capital markets in Europe jumped in January 1999
into the first league with their US dollar and Japanese yen counterparts. It then takes the measure of
the potential gain in liquidity in the European government bond market. It describes several possible
outcomes in terms of the relationship between government bond cash and futures markets. While it is
recognised that it is very hard to predict the outcome even after the introduction of the euro,
developments even through 1998 suggest a considerable centralisation of risk management activity in
the European government bond market. This development points to a more liquid government bond
market in Europe. The European manifestations of the global flight to quality and liquidity last
summer suggest that the liquidity of the European government bond market would benefit from a
broader basis for futures contracts than that afforded by single government’s debt.
As noted in the Overview of this volume, liquidity is an elusive concept. This paper relies on turnover
data from derivatives markets to indicate liquidity. These data are consulted rather than the more
frequently cited stocks of underlying cash bonds or even transactions in cash markets for several
reasons. A practical reason is that it is easier to assemble comparable data on derivative transactions
than for cash transactions. In addition, the derivatives markets represent the most liquid pole of the
closely linked cash and derivatives markets. This is evident in lower bid-ask spreads, as shown for the
US market in the Fleming and Sarker paper in this volume. It is also evident in transactions volume
and outstanding instruments, larger in the futures market than in the underlying cash instruments in the
US Treasury market, and even more so in the European government bond markets.
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2. The euro and the money market
The prospect of the euro supported and its introduction completed a remarkable process of
convergence of private interest rates in Europe. As shown in figure 1, by the time of the May 1998
announcement of which countries would share the single currency from the outset, yields in all but the
shortest-dated private interest rate contracts had fallen to or near levels prevailing for the Deutsche
mark. Indeed, this process had largely run its course by late spring and early summer of 1997.
Ironically, the interest rates most influenced by central banks, namely those prevailing in the money-
market, proved the last to converge. It was only in December 1999 that the central banks of the euro
1 Serge Jeanneau, “Interest rate futures: Characteristics and Market Development”, in BIS International Financial Market
and Banking Developments, November 1995 and February 1996.2
area acted with near unanimity to lower their policy rates to 3%; the Bank of Italy’s policy rate
remained above that level until the arrival of the euro proper. In part because of the lag between bond
yield convergence and policy rate convergence, futures contracts base on three-month interbank rates
denominated in French franc, Italian lira, and Spanish peseta, as traded respectively in Paris, London
and Madrid, remained very active and maintained their market share vis-à-vis the offshore Deutsche
mark contract traded in London. By contrast, as discussed below, futures trading in 10-year
government bonds in the euro area did concentrate quite markedly in the German government bond
contract in the approach to the euro’s introduction.
This competitive equilibrium among the money market futures contracts in Europe, however, could
not survive the introduction of the euro. The competition between two money-market futures contracts
in the US dollar, namely a contract based on certificates of deposit issued in New York and between
interbank deposits in London, resulted in the dominance of the latter. Liquidity draws transactions and
transactions make for liquidity in a virtuous circle that gives competition in the futures business a
winner take all aspect.
At the introduction of the euro, there were two contenders for the benchmark 3-month interbank rate.
The British Bankers Association polls 16 banks for euro deposit rates at various maturities every
working day, trims the 4 highest and 4 lowest rates, and averages the remaining yields to produce a
euro LIBOR. Each bank in the panel “contributes the rate at which it could borrow funds, were it to do
so by asking for and then accepting inter-bank offers in reasonable market size, just prior to 1100
hours”.
2 The heavy trimming of high and low rates responded to the perception that Deutsche mark
LIBOR had been biased upwards by the presence of two Japanese banks and the practice of only
trimming the top two rates. Remarkably, the panel of 16 top-rated banks contains only 4 from the euro
area itself—two German banks, one French bank and one Dutch bank. By contrast, 9 US, Canadian
and UK banks bulk large in the 16-bank euro LIBOR panel.
The other contender is the European Bankers Association’s Euro Interbank Offered Rate (EurIBOR),
defined as the “rate at which Euro interbank term deposits within the Euro zone are offered by one
Prime Bank to another Prime Bank”. With 57 banks, the panel is large and spread across the euro area:
18 in Germany, 12 in Paris, 7 in Italy, 5 in Madrid, 3 in each of Brussels, Amsterdam and
Luxembourg, 2 in Helsinki and Vienna and one in each of Dublin and Lisbon. Out of the 57 banks,
only 10 are headquartered outside the euro area. The calculation of EurIBOR involves less trimming,
with only the top and bottom 15% of rates excluded.
Advance commentary on the two contenders highlighted the implications of both reserve requirements
and a broader EurIBOR panel. Had the European Central Bank (ECB) chosen to impose
unremunerated reserve requirements on banks in the euro area, an offshore rate would almost surely
have prevailed. This was the experience in the US dollar market, where the domestic certificate of
deposit based contract laboured under the disadvantage of Federal Reserve Regulation D reserves. In
the event, the ECB accepted the Bundesbank argument for reserve requirements, but decided in mid-
1998 to remunerate them at a market-related rate. This left the fight a fair one.
As to the size of the panel, a large chorus of banks, it was argued, would necessarily be a less prime
panel and a less prime panel would mean a EurIBOR above euro LIBOR. To some extent, those
designing the EurIBOR rate addressed this problem by specifying that the rates to be reported are
those of Prime Banks, rather than the reporting bank’s own, possibly higher, dealing rates. It is not
clear what difference these different specifications make: Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi reported an
identical rate of 3.28% in both panels on 29 January, reflecting about a 20 basis-point “Japan
premium”.
Experience during the first month and a half of competition between euro LIBOR and EurIBOR offers
some support for the advance commentary. EurIBOR tended to come in a bit higher than its London
competitor. In the 32 trading days for value dates in January and the first half of February (i.e., 30
2 Reuters page BBALIBORT, 29 January 1999.3
December through 12 February, inclusive), EurIBOR exceeded euro LIBOR by a rounded one basis
point on 7 days and euro LIBOR never exceeded EurIBOR by the same amount. On average over the
32 days, euro LIBOR came in a fifth of a basis point below EurIBOR. Moreover, on the scant time
series evidence of the first month, euro LIBOR appears the more sensitive indicator, dropping faster to
its trough a day before its Continental rival’s trough on the 20
th of January (see Table 1).
EuroLIBOR and EurIBOR compete on three fields. The first is in loan and bond contracts. A
borrower negotiating a credit with a bank or a bond issuer negotiating with its underwriters must fix a
reference rate for floating-rate charges. Better names will seek to use, or reserve the option to use, the
lower interest rate. In the early 1980s, the Kingdom of Sweden insisted on having the option to borrow
at a spread over the US certificate of deposit rate or dollar LIBOR. Based only on the data so far, a
prime borrower would tend to want to use euro LIBOR (for a given spread). Instead, Abbey National,
a highly-rated UK bank that frequently issues in the international debt market, issued euro 2 billion in
floating rate notes on the 14
th of January based on eurIBOR. Since the issuer of such a jumbo issue
may be presumed to be seeking to offer investors maximum liquidity, Abbey National’s choice
signalled a market preference for euro area rate over the London rate.
Another field of competition is in the over-the-counter derivative market. Those trading forward rate
agreements—essentially side bets on money-market rates in 3 or 6 months--must decide on a reference
rate. More important is the choice of benchmark money market rate for the floating leg of interest rate
swaps, used to transform floating to fixed financing or assets (or vice-versa). The choice of reference
rates in new swap contracts reflects the best guesses of professionals, but is generally unobservable. It
is interesting that the fixed rates for euro swaps are identical, whether based on euro LIBOR or
EurIBOR; if a noticeable difference in yields were expected to persist, then the fixed rates
corresponding to EurIBOR would be higher.
3 LIFFE officials are reported to have estimated in late
January that 60-80% of new contracts in 1999 had referred to EurIBOR.
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The third field of competition is in the futures market. Here euro LIBOR had the advantage that
Deutsche mark LIBOR was the most heavily traded money-market futures contract in Europe; lira
LIBOR also traded in volume (Table 2). EurIBOR is the successor to Euroland’s number two money-
market contract, the Paris Interbank Offered Rate (PIBOR) and the lesser traded Madrid Interbank
Offered Rate (MIBOR). In terms of the locus of trading, both LIFFE in London and Eurex in
Frankfurt offered trading in euro LIBOR, while LIFFE, Eurex and the MATIF in Paris all have set up
to trade EurIBOR.
At writing, EurIBOR seems to have trounced euro LIBOR in the futures markets. Euro LIBOR still
has more contracts outstanding on LIFFE, given the weight of contracts opened in Deutsche mark, and
Italian lira before the introduction of the euro proper (Table 3). Even in London, however, transactions
at the margin take place in the 3-month euro contract based not on London rates but rather on the euro
area interest rates. Indeed, the LIFFE accommodated itself to eurIBOR’s prospective success by
launching a eurIBOR contract on the 8
th of December. The exchange then enabled holders of position
in euro LIBOR, euromark and eurolira contracts to convert these into eurIBOR positions on the 19
th of
January and again on the 17
th of February.
However the competition turns out, it is easy to overstate the consequences of the eventual dominance
of one or the other reference rate. Clearly, some in the euro area treat this as an important issue. The
predominance of European banks in the EurIBOR panel as well as its restriction to banks in the euro
area point to pride of ownership and pride of place. Many in London claim that the competition was
skewed by political pressure on Continental banks to favour eurIBOR. There may, however, be a
confusion here between the geographical source of the reference rates and the locus of the jobs
3  For example, Deutsche mark swap rates based on DM LIBOR exceeded French franc swap rates based on PIBOR for
much of 1997-98 because the larger share of Japanese banks in the DM LIBOR panel was tending to raise DM LIBOR
relative to PIBOR>
4 Edward Luce, “Euribor gaining ground on ‘offshore’ rival”, Financial Times 21 January 1999, p. 21.4
associated with trading contracts based on it. By way of parallel, it should be recalled that the
compilation of dollar LIBOR may provide a few jobs in London and may afford that centre some
prestige. The heavy trading of dollar LIBOR nevertheless occurs in Chicago, with substantial trading
in Singapore. Put otherwise, precious few jobs would be created in New York were LIBOR suddenly
somehow to lose out to NYIBOR. From the standpoint of competing financial centres, the interesting
question is not euro LIBOR versus eurIBOR but rather London trading of either of these versus
Continental trading of either. At this stage, it looks as though London is ahead in trading eurIBOR.
Stepping back from the competition among rate sources and among financial centres, the key
observation is that the euro area has a unified money market. The collection of interest rates in London
and in the euro area can be considered a “natural experiment” and the conclusion is evidently that
there is a single euro money market stretching across Europe. To be complete and truly competitive
with the dollar money market, it will need to have an active repurchase market joining the money
market to the government bond market. Here the operations of the European System of Central Banks
can be counted on to homogenise European repurchase markets.
Another money market instrument that can be expected to benefit from the single currency is
commercial paper. The contrast between the US money market and its European counterparts has been
very striking in this regard. With over a trillion dollars in outstanding commercial paper, the US
market dwarfs not only its European domestic counterparts but also the euromarket. Even in the latter,
dollar paper outstanding, at $111 billion at end-1998 is triple that of euro area currencies, at $36
billion.
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Finally, the introduction of the euro has added a Treasury bill market to the world’s second largest
reserve currency. For years the Bundesbank’s disapproval of short-term finance kept the German
finance ministry from issuing paper. As a result, many central banks and other risk-averse investors
accepted bank risk, either directly by making deposits in Deutsche mark with banks or indirectly by
buying US Treasury bills and selling dollars forward against Deutsche mark with a bank counterparty.
Now with the euro, central banks can buy French Treasury bills denominated in euro. Indeed, bowing
to the inevitable, the Bundesbank has dropped its opposition to the German government’s sale of bills.
One way of summarising the effect of the euro on the liquidity of the money market is by comparing
derivatives transactions in euro area money market instruments with their counterparts in the dollar
and yen. Table 2 shows that in 1997, proto-euro area transactions had surpassed those in yen while
still falling significantly short of transactions in the dollar.
3. The euro and the private capital market
Unlike the money market, there was no dicontinuity in yields in the private bond market in the euro
area at the introduction of the euro. As figure 1 makes clear, the convergence of long–term private
yields had largely run its course 18 months before the euro’s arrival. In particular, swap rates in the
euro’s various predecessor currencies had already anticipated the arrival of the euro, so in some
respects the private capital market has been unified for some time.
This section discusses the euro’s effect on the private bond market in Europe under two headings.
First, the greater size and liquidity of the swap market is considered, as well as its linkage to dollar
(and yen) fixed income markets through the currency swap market. Then, discussion turns to the
implication of the single money for sharper competition among underwriters.
5 BIS, International Banking and Financial Market Developments, February 1999, p. 16 and annex page 70.5
3.1 The euro and the swap market
The introduction of the euro has collapsed into a single swap market several distinct, albeit already
closely linked, markets. In this single swap market, prime banks and corporations manage their
interest rate risk by buying and selling fixed-rate payments against floating-rate payments. Maturities
range from 1 to 2 years out to 10 years or longer. Even in the US market, the swap market is more
liquid than the cash market in US corporate or foreign dollar issues; outside of the US market, where
corporate bond markets are less developed, this observation holds a fortiori.
Since interest-rate swaps have two legs, one a floating-rate stream of interest payments, the initial
competition between two floating-rate indices in euro slowed the integration of the euro swap market
by some days. Thus, in the first days of the euro there was some difference in pricing of swaps,
depending on whether the floating-rate leg was based on euro LIBOR or on eurIBOR. But that
difference disappeared and since then there has effectively been only one price at which floating-rate
streams of interest payments are exchanged against fixed streams of interest payments.
The swap market in euro promises to be as active, and therefore as liquid, as the US dollar swap
market. In 1996, the International Swaps and Derivatives Association reported $4¼ trillion in turnover
in both US dollar swaps and in the euro’s 4 major predecessor currencies (Table 4). In 1997, however,
the four European markets taken together grew by a half, while the US dollar market hardly grew.
Even recognising that convergence trades, which effectively netted out with the arrival of the euro,
boosted activity in 1996-98 (Bradbery, 1996), the euro swap market probably started off larger than its
US counterpart and well ahead of the yen swap market in turnover.
Even as the interest-rate swap market in Europe gains liquidity, its linkage to the dollar and yen fixed
income markets will become stronger. Judging by indicated bid-ask spreads, swapping from euros into
dollars is already on average be cheaper than swapping from the euro’s predecessor currencies. That
is, before the introduction of the euro, swaps out of some of the predecessor currencies were not
cheap. To be sure, swaps between dollars and Deutsche mark, French franc, Italian lira, ECU, Dutch
guilders and Belgian franc all showed posted bid-ask spreads of 3 basis points. Those between dollars
and Spanish pesetas, Portuguese escudo, Austrian schillings, Finnish markka, and Irish pounds all
however showed wider spreads, ranging from 4 to 10 basis points (McCauley and White, p. 42). With
the euro, incentives for swapping fixed-income assets or liabilities across the euro area are stronger by
virtue of the same low transactions costs.
One clear implication of these improvements in swap market liquidity is greater issuance and
investment in euros. For instance, if the Republic of the Philippines has issued repeatedly in the dollar
sector, so that it is in danger of wearing out its welcome and moving its spread against itself, but still
wants dollar funding, it might achieve better all-in costs from selling a euro fixed-rate bond and
swapping it into dollars. As a result, issuance in euros is encouraged. Or, if mortgage bonds were to
fall out of favour in Europe, they could be more economically turned into synthetic dollar or yen paper
(through so-called asset swaps) and sold to US or Japanese insurance companies, thereby encouraging
investment euro-area instruments, if not in euros.
The importance of these liquidity effects can be inferred from the skewing toward denomination in the
dollar of larger issues in the international bond market. Right across different category of issuers,
jumbo issues have been more likely to be denominated in dollars (Table 5). This may reflect the
formerly greater size of dollar-based portfolios at pension funds and insurance companies. It may also
have reflected keener competition among underwriters in the dollar market (see immediately below).
To some extent it may have reflected the greater liquidity of the underlying government bond market,
permitting easier hedging of dollar holdings with government bond futures and repurchase-market
transactions (also see below).
3.2 The euro and competition among underwriters
If multiple currencies in Europe tend to segment its bond markets, keener competition in the bond
market should result from monetary union. As background, consider the range of factors that bear on
competition in a primary bond market. One can conceive of bond underwriters drawing their6
competitive advantage from one of three sources: relations with the issuers, general understanding of
the money and bond markets, including the direction of rates and associated movements in spreads,
and relations with end-investors. Government bond auctions seek to limit the influence of the first
factor, and studies of the US Treasury market have in fact emphasised "a large customer base with
heavy order flow" as the principal source of competitive advantage (see Ruocco et al. (1991)).
The source of competitive advantage bears directly on the question of the effect of monetary union. If
relations with issuers are key, then the euro will tend not to disturb competition. But if an underwriter
benefits from understanding the direction of national interest rates, or from access to investors, then
the euro will sharpen competition. No longer will a French bank have a natural edge in understanding
the monetary and fiscal policies that can move the French bond market, and eventually a French bank
will not be able to use its French investor base to win deals.
One test for whether the euro will sharpen competition in the bond market, therefore, is to check
whether currency makes a difference in the choice of underwriter, controlling for the nationality of the
bond issuer. The test can be performed on the international bond market for reasons both of data
availability and of relevance. The data are relevant because the international bond market is, to a
considerable extent, the euro bond market to be: one-quarter of the outstanding issues feature EU
issuers in EU currencies, and a substantial fraction of investors are EU institutional investors. An early
study of this question documented a decline of issuer-underwriter relations and a rise in the role of
currency in the selection of underwriter (see Courtadon (1985)). A more recent study (Balder et al.
(1991)) found a strong association between the nationality of the lead underwriter and the currency
denomination of the bond for all but eurodollar issues, where customer relations seemed important.
Most recently, Dermine (1996) points to the dominance of home-country lead managers in the league
tables by currency sector, without distinguishing the influence of customer from that of currency.
An analysis of the effect of customer nationality and the currency denomination of the bond on the
choice of lead managers (dubbed bookrunner after a period of title inflation) points to the strong
predominance of currency effects over issuer effects in European currency sectors (see Table 6).
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German, French, UK and Dutch underwriters capture fairly close to the same share of the business of
home-country issuers and foreign issuers, but show huge differences in market shares in their home
currencies as against all other currencies. As found previously, the influence of customer and that of
currency is much more balanced for US underwriters.
The upshot of this analysis is that separate currencies in Europe have tended to segment the
international bond market and that, over time, currency has shown more persistence as a factor bearing
on competition than have relations between customers and underwriters. Brown (1996, p. 4) argues
that the competitive challenge is not symmetrical: "the advantage German banks have had in the no. 2
international capital market, the euro-DM market, will not carry over into the euro capital market". As
underwriter competition becomes sharper under the euro, the cost of corporate issuance of debt should
decline. Another factor that could ease the marketing of European corporate bonds would be a more
integrated European market for government bonds. To this we turn.
6 The association of currency of issue and nationality of underwriter, however, seems weaker in 1996 than it was in 1983
for the mark, pound and guilder sectors (see Courtadon (1985), pp. 40-41). And even today, some sectors of the
international bond market show a stronger influence of customer ties, in contrast to the general finding in the text. For
instance, the Neue Zürcher Zeitung of 20th February 1997, p. 25, reports that the Japanese big four securities firms plus
Tokyo-Mitsubishi and Kankaku captured 46.5% of the underwriting mandates of Japanese issuers in the Swiss franc
market, more than the 39% captured by the Swiss big three plus Gotthard Bank. But this SF 7.4 billion sector features
small, often equity-related, issues, and the customer base may include a large proportion of Japanese accounts.7
4. The euro and the European government bond market
How much increased liquidity will the euro area government bond markets derive from the single
currency? One view is that it will remain quite fragmented. The often-repeated analogy of the US
municipal bond market can be dismissed quickly, however. The point of tangency between the euro
area government bond market and the market for state and local debt in the United States is that
variable spreads set off one euro-area sovereign’s bonds from another (Table 7), just as they mark off
the bonds of California from those of New York. But the tax treatment of municipal bonds fragments
demand—there are no national mutual funds for these assets to speak of—and an attempted futures
contract never got off the ground. The European government bond market will not in its liquidity
aspect resemble the US municipal bond market or indeed any other subnational government bond
market. Neither the former nor the latter has an associated futures contract, drawing on and feeding the
liquidity of the cash market.
It is useful to start off with an understanding of the structure of the government bond market of the
proto-euro area. There were four major governments whose bonds underlay four different futures
contracts (Figure 2). These futures markets were all of fairly recent origin: the mid-1980s in the case
of the futures on French government bonds, and the early 1990s in the case of the others. Trading in
French government bond futures centred in Paris and trading in Spanish government bond futures in
Barcelona. The London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange originally traded most
of the German and Italian government bond futures, but the Eurex in Frankfurt succeeded in winning
the German bond business back in the course of 1998. Frankfurt eating London’s lunch made good
copy but perhaps obscured two underlying trends. First was the increasing liquidity of the European
government bond market relative to its US counterpart. Second was the tipping of liquidity in the
European government bond market toward the market leader.
In the mid- to late-1990s, the European government bond market was catching up, and by some
measures surpassing, its US counterpart. Taken together, transactions in futures based on euro area
government bonds have exceeded transactions in US Treasuries or Japanese government bonds since
1996 (Table 8). Transactions in German government bond futures alone nosed past those in US
Treasuries in 1996 and well exceeded them in 1998. It should be recognised, however, that not all the
measures on Table 8 put the German government bond market ahead of the US Treasury market on
the eve of the euro. Government bond option trading remains more active in Chicago than in all the
Continental government bond markets combined. Weighted by duration, moreover, the figures would
probably show the US Treasury market still ahead, given the heavy trade in the 20-year bond in
Chicago as against the 10-year bond on the Continent. In addition, the range of choice in the US
Treasury futures is broader, with active trading in both the intermediate sector and the long sector. In
Europe the only real choice in nodes is in the German bond futures market which offers only the
choice of two intermediate maturities, namely the 5- and 10-year.
Recognising the longer duration and wider range of trading nodes available in the US Treasury
futures, it is still fair to say that the German government bond futures singlehandedly stacked up
favourably against its US counterpart, even before the arrival of the euro. This result reflected the
concentration of liquidity in the German government bond future as the euro approached. In early
1993, the futures contracts on the French and German government bonds traded in roughly equal
amounts, with each representing about 45% of turnover in what would become the euro area. By 1998
the German government contract represented about 80% of trading the French government contract
only about 10% (Figure 3). Clearly, with currency concerns increasingly remote, market participants
found it convenient to hedge risks or take positions in generic euro area fixed income by using the
bund future.
With the advent of the euro, the bund share has increased into the upper 80s (Table 9). Thus, the
structure of the euro government bond market could shift to that shown schematically in Figure 4.
Perhaps in view of the two-tiers of spreads over the German government bond at the 10-year maturity
(Table 7 and Figure 5), the more likely scenario is Figure 6, in which the Spanish or Italian
government bond future sustains itself. (Such a structure would offer the world a liquid means of
trading a credit spread, which might find application in the dollar and yen markets, even if the8
correlation between credit risk across European sovereigns were an imperfect proxy for corporate
credit spreads.)
The problem with market participants’ hedging generic euro area risk with the German bund contract
was demonstrated during the so-called bund squeeze in the summer of 1998. The immediate market
background was a heightened sense of credit risk (arising from the Russian default) and an
unprecedented premium placed on the most liquid government bonds deliverable into futures
contracts. Not only did this period see a widening of credit spreads, whether those between swap
yields and US Treasury yields, or junk bond yields and US Treasury yields. In addition, liquidity
spreads widened. In particular, the spread between US Treasury bonds deliverable into futures
contracts (“on the run bonds”) and the undeliverable bonds with proximate time to maturity widened
to an unheard of spread. In Europe this same phenomenon found its clearest expression in the yield
gap between German government-guaranteed paper, for instance bonds of the export agency KfW,
which are zero-weighted under the Basle capital rules, and the German government bond of the same
10-year maturity. The KfW could not be delivered into the futures contract, while the German
government bond could. At launch in spring 1998, a jumbo KfW bond offered a 10-15 basis-point
pick-up against the benchmark German government bond. This yield premium reflected a compound
of slightly higher credit risk arising from a guarantee rather than full faith and credit backing, on the
one hand, and the lesser prospective liquidity of the guaranteed bond on the other hand). At times in
the fall of 1998, however, the guaranteed bond traded to yield more than 40 basis points more than the
German benchmark bond. This development points to a headlong rush into the most liquid instruments
as leveraged portfolios holding long positions in less liquid bonds against short positions in benchmark
bonds were wound down in the face of financing constraints.
This same premium on liquidity affected the spreads among benchmark government bonds in the euro
area. Some observers have suggested that the widening of spreads across bonds of different sovereigns
in Euroland in the summer of 1998 shown in Figure 5 proves that highly variable credit spreads will
necessarily leave the European government bond market fractured and relatively illiquid. But this view
ignores the divergent developments in the liquidity of benchmark bonds and the importance of
liquidity as measured by the widening of the KfW-bund spread. Therefore, rather than just a sudden
reappraisal of credit risk, the sovereign spread widening reflected liquidity, particularly in the case of
the spread of the French bond yield over that on the German bond. In extreme circumstances, at least,
the tilt of liquidity to the German futures contract led to idiosyncratic price movements that
undermined its usefulness as a hedge for other fixed-income risk in Europe. Although there was a
parallel development in the US Treasury market, it seems to have been worse in Europe because of the
relatively narrow base of deliverable German government bonds. To be sure, particular circumstances
and the impending transition to the euro suggest caution in interpreting this episode.
7 Still, the squeeze
highlighted the awkwardness of an evolutionary outcome in which derivatives trading on a scale
7 In addition, it could be argued that the initial conditions last year in the European bond market helped set the stage for the
shortage of German government paper. Two or three years ago, heavy buying of French government bonds by French
insurance companies pushed yields down below those available on bunds and induced foreign portfolio managers to
abandon the French market for the German market. In 1997 and early 1998, as liquidity shifted to the German
government bond market and bunds outperformed their French and Dutch counterparts, these portfolio managers retained
their heavy portfolio weights on the bunds. These holdings limited the free “float” of bonds available in the market for
repurchase and thus limited the paper available for delivery into the maturing futures contracts. Thus a “squeeze” was
more likely because bunds has so recently come to command a premium price. (In mid-July Michael Rosenberg of
Merrill Lunch, referring to the squeeze in the bund benchmark, trimmed his recommended holdings of bunds in favour of
French government bonds. See Currency & Bond Market Trends, 16 July 1998, p. 17.) To some extent, therefore, the
situation last fall should be interpreted as a disequilibrium in which the derivatives markets favoured the bund, but the
“value investors” in the cash bond market had not yet shifted away from the overpriced bunds. Another factor that may
have inhibited portfolio reallocations by value investors was the administrative complication of the upcoming conversion
to euros of Euroland bonds. A broader range of bonds in a given portfolio would make more work at the turn of the year
and this factor may have inhibited value trades away from the German bunds.9
comparable to that in the US Treasury market rests on the narrow base of a single European
government’s cash market debt.
A structure that might be more conducive to liquidity would be one that overcame the imbalance
between futures and underlying cash bonds by permitting more than one sovereign’s bonds to be
delivered into a single contract. Such so-called multiple issuer deliverability is shown schematically in
Figure 7 in the context of a two-tier euro area market. As an example, the German, French and Dutch
government bonds could be delivered into one contract, and the Italian, Spanish and Portuguese into
another. Such a structure would recognise substantial credit differences between tiers, while
suppressing, or making adjustments for, small differences within tiers. Such an approach, widely if not
universally regarded as feasible by market participants, could not preclude later divergences in credit
that would break down the structure.
8
Governments could encourage such a development with measures to bring their debt management into
convergence. These measures need not include mutual guarantees or even common schedules for the
auction of new government bonds. Instead, matching maturities, coupons, coupon dates, and other
conventions could serve to make it easier for market participants to treat paper carrying different
signatures as practically interchangeable. The treatment by the European System of Central Banks of
collateral will all by itself tend to homogenise repurchase markets for government debt, but further
efforts in that direction would offer governments a reward in the form of more liquid markets.
These suggestions may sound unlikely in view of the present open competition among futures
exchanges and implicit competition between ministries of finance. Keating (1996) anticipated a
prisoner’s dilemma situation in which European taxpayers would collectively benefit from
coordination of debt management, but individual ministries of finance would undermine that collective
interest in the pursuit of a unique benchmark status for their government’s debt. Nevertheless, the
ultimate convergence of debt management practices with respect to the redenomination of stocks of
government debt into euros in January 1999 suggests the power of liquidity to persuade policy-
makers. The early intention of the French authorities to redenominate led other European governments
to follow suit lest the French government bond market derive a unique liquidity advantage from
having old euro-denominated bonds to trade against the new euro-denominated bonds that euro area
governments had committed themselves to issue. As euro area governments followed the French lead
in order to deny the French government bond market a “first-mover” advantage, they ended up
converging on the first important debt management question posed by the introduction of the euro.
The disappointment of those in the market that European governments chose different approaches to
redenomination, choices which ruined the first weekend in 1999 for many professionals, should not
obscure the common outcome of rapid redenomnation.
It would be a mistake to underestimate the power of the particular interests engaged in the ultimate
structure of the euro area government bond market. And under the best of circumstances, debt
managers in Europe (and the United States) face a real challenge in reconciling the needs of futures
markets, which grew up in eras of large fiscal deficits, with more prudent fiscal management. In any
case, it seems unlikely that four national ten-year contracts will survive in the euro area. However
things turn out, the introduction of the euro seems to have increased the liquidity of the European fixed
income markets relative to their US counterparts. The liquidity of the euro area government bond
market would benefit from a broadening of the cash market basis of the fewer contracts that remain.
8 Futures professional recall how the successful US certificate of deposit contract lost out to the dollar LIBOR contract
when the Latin American debt crisis of the early 1980s led to the breakdown of the “run” of large banks, any of whose
certificates could be delivered into a maturing contract.10
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Table 1
Three-month offered rates on deposits in euros, January-February 1999
EurIBOR EuroLIBOR Difference
Day
(in %) (in %) (basis pts)
30.12.98 3.248 3.25000 – 0.200
31.12.98 3.245 3.23875 0.625
04.01.99 3.234 3.22125 1.275
05.01.99 3.222 3.21234 0.966
06.01.99 3.214 3.20734 0.666
07.01.99 3.206 3.20250 0.350
08.01.99 3.196 3.19750 – 0.150
11.01.99 3.193 3.19219 0.081
12.01.99 3.190 3.18719 0.281
13.01.99 3.183 3.17844 0.456
14.01.99 3.163 3.16625 – 0.325
15.01.99 3.134 3.12688 0.712
18.01.99 3.102 3.09547 0.653
19.01.99 3.056 3.05000 0.600
20.01.99 3.054 3.05063 0.337
21.01.99 3.056 3.05375 0.225
22.01.99 3.059 3.05656 0.244
25.01.99 3.069 3.07156 – 0.256
26.01.99 3.080 3.08438 – 0.438
27.01.99 3.080 3.08188 – 0.188
28.01.99 3.077 3.07438 0.262
29.01.99 3.074 3.07375 0.025
01.02.99 3.078 3.08063 – 0.263
02.02.99 3.091 3.09234 – 0.134
03.02.09 3.098 3.09734 0.066
04.02.99 3.105 3.10125 0.375
05.02.99 3.107 3.10250 0.450
08.02.99 3.113 3.11469 – 0.169
09.02.99 3.112 3.11125 0.075
10.02.99 3.109 3.10594 0.306
11.02.99 3.106 3.10750 – 0.150
12.02.99 3.100 3.09938 0.06212
Table 2
Derivative transactions in private money market instruments in dollars, yen and euros
In trillions of US dollars per annum
1995 1996 1997 1998
US dollar
Eurodollar futures (CME, SIMEX) 104.1 97.1 107.2 119.3
Federal funds (CBOT) 3.2 3.0 4.6 4.2
Forward rate agreements
1 4.7 n.a. n.a. 5.9
Eurodollar options (CME, SIMEX) 22.4 22.2 29.6 33.1
Japanese yen
Euroyen futures (TIFFE, SIMEX) 46.8 34.7 29.9 23.5
Forward rate agreements
1 2.5 n.a. n.a. 0.8
Euroyen options (TIFFE, SIMEX) 0.5 0.7 0.9 0.9
Total Deutsche mark, French franc, Italian lira,
Spanish pesetas
Euro-mark/franc/lira futures 37.2 43.3 48.3 46.1
Forward rate agreements 5.2 n.a. n.a. 2.3
Euro-mark/franc/lira options 7.3 7.1 6.5 5.4
Deutsche mark
Euromark futures (LIFFE) 18.4 24.0 25.6 31.5
Forward rate agreements
1 2.2 n.a. n.a. 4.9




contracts (MATIF) 15.9 13.7 12.3 4.4
Forward rate agreements 2.6
3 n.a. n.a. 0.2
PIBOR options (MATIF) 4.7 3.0 2.4 0.4
Italian lira
Eurolira futures (LIFFE) 2.4 4.5 8.7 8.9
Forward rate agreements 0.5
3 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Eurolira options (LIFFE) 0.1 0.6 1.4 1.5
Spanish pesetas
Europeseta futures 3 month (MEFF) 0.5 1.0 1.7 1.3
Forward rate agreements
1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Europeseta options 4 month (MEFF) 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.1
Note: Japanese yen, Deutsche mark, French franc and Italian lira amounts converted at year-average exchange rates.
1  Estimated as average daily turnover in April times 255.   
2  Paris interbank offered rate.   
3  Estimated as DM forward
rate agreements (FRAs) times the ratio of FRA trading in Paris or Milan to FRA trading in Frankfurt.
Sources: Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT), Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), London International Financial Futures
and Options Exchange (LIFFE), Marché à Terme Internationale de France (MATIF),  Singapore International Monetary
Exchange (SIMEX), Tokyo International Financial Futures Exchange (TIFFE), Central Bank Survey of Foreign Exchange
and Derivatives Market Activity 1995, BIS and author's estimates.13
Table 3
Three-month euro contracts on LIFFE
On 12 February 1999, in thousands of contracts of a million euros each
Volume Open interest
Settlement date
EurIBOR Euro LIBOR EurIBOR Euro LIBOR
March 1999 34 0 141 161
June 1999 22 2 116 126
September 1999 28 0 69 123
December 1999 12 0 73 99
March 2000 12 0 52 94
June 2000 60 34 74
September 2000 40 42 48
December 2000 30 17 20
March 2001 30 15 19
June 2001 2051 2
September 2001 2071 0
December 2001 1045
Source: London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange14
Table 4
Transactions in interest rate swaps and swaptions in dollars, yen and euros
(in trillions of US dollars per annum)
Central
bank survey




1995 1996 1997 1998
US dollar 5.98
Swaps 4.28 2.86 4.21 4.39 9.13
Swaptions 1.70
Japanese yen 4.90
Swaps 4.38 2.26 2.83 2.90 3.60
Swaptions 0.52
Total mark, franc, lira,
peseta > 4.68
Swaps 3.91 2.41 4.28 6.39 <17.39
Swaptions 0.77
Deutsche mark 1.95













Swaps 0.09 0.22 0.32
1  Estimated as average daily turnover in April times 255.   
2  Estimated as DM swaps times the ratio of ISDA-reported
French franc swaps or ISDA-reported Italian lira swaps to ISDA-reported DM swaps.   
3  Estimated as DM swaptions
times the ratio of swaption transactions in Paris or Milan to such transactions in Frankfurt.
Sources: ISDA, Central Bank Survey of Foreign Exchange and Derivatives Market Activity 1995, BIS and author’s
estimates.15
Table 5
International security issues by issue size and currency
Size of issue
< $1.0 bn ³ $1.0 bn
Total
Currency by region
in billions of US dollars, 1990-95
Developing countries 141.7 10.5 152.2
US dollar 96.8 7.4 104.2
EU currencies 17.6 0.0 17.6
Japanese yen 27.3 3.2 30.5
Developed countries 1,555.7 209.1 1,764.8
US dollar 554.9 119.5 674.4
EU currencies 660.1 58.9 719.0
Japanese yen 340.8 30.6 371.4
International institutions 117.1 39.9 216.9
US dollar 34.1 15.0 49.1
EU currencies 113.9 15.3 129.3
Japanese yen 29.1 9.5 38.6
Total 1,874.5 259.5 2,134.0
US dollar 685.8 141.9 827.7
EU currencies 791.6 74.3 865.9
Japanese yen 397.1 43.3 440.4
Grand total, including
offshore centres 2,078.6 276.9 2,355.5
Note: Including bonds and medium-term notes.
Source: BIS.16
Table 6
Currency and home-country relationship in the choice of bond bookrunner, 1996
Percentage market share won by bookrunners of indicated nationality
German bookrunners French bookrunners
Borrower Currency Borrower Currency
Mark Other All French franc Other All
German 44 16 24 French 86 10 25
Other 37 2 5O t h e r 75 2 5
All 39 4 8A l l 77 2 6
UK bookrunners Dutch bookrunners
Borrower Currency Borrower Currency
Pound Other All Guilder Other All
UK 40 21 31 Dutch 83 26 48
Other 48 3 5O t h e r 85 2 3
All 44 4 7A l l 84 2 5
US bookrunners Japanese bookrunners
Borrower Currency Borrower Currency
Dollar Other All Yen Other All
US 86 46 76 Japanese 75 46 59
Other 54 13 28 Other 87 6 14
All 64 16 37 All 84 8 17
Note: Each entry shows market share of German, French, UK, Dutch, US or Japanese bookrunners for issuers of the
indicated nationality in the indicated currency. For example, the 44% in the upper left-hand corner means that German
underwriters ran the books for 44% of the bonds of German issuers that were denominated in marks. Data include all
bonds in the Euromoney database, including international bonds issued under medium-term note programmes, that are not
equity-related. Total amount of bond issuance by currency: DM: $81 billion; French franc: $37 billion; pound: $54 billion;
guilder: $22 billion; dollar: $319 billion; yen: $91 billion; grand total: $725 billion.
Sources: Euromoney Bondware and BIS.17
Table 7
Yield spreads to the German Government bund of 10-year benchmark issues in Europe





















Derivative transactions in long-term government securities
(in trillions of US dollars perannum)
1995 1996 1997 1998
US Treasuries
Futures 12.4 12.1 14.1 16.6
Exchange-traded options 3.6 3.7 3.9 5.3
OTC
1 options 0.4
Cash market trading 35.8
Outstandings (at year-end) 2.5 2.7 2.7 2.6
Japanese government bonds
Futures 16.2 12.3 10.6 9.0
Exchange-traded options 2.2 1.8 1.6 1.4
OTC
1 options 1.6
Cash market trading 6.5
Outstandings (at year-end) 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.7
German, French, Italian and Spanish bonds
Futures 15.4 19.2 21.2 23.9
Exchange-traded options 2.6 3.0 3.0 2.3
OTC
1 options > 0.6
Cash market trading 19.3
Outstandings (at year-end) 1.6 1.7 1.5 1.9
German bonds
Futures 9.3 12.3 14.5 19.5
Exchange-traded options 1.3 1.5 1.8 1.9
OTC
1 options 0.1
Cash market trading 16.6
Outstandings (at year-end) 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.6
French bonds
Futures 3.4 3.4 3.1 2.2




Cash market trading 1.7
Outstandings (at year-end) 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5
Italian bonds
Futures 1.6 2.0 2.2 1.1
Exchange-traded options 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.1
OTC
1 options 0.0
Cash market trading 0.4
3
Outstandings (at year-end) 0.4
4 0.5 0.4 0.5
Spanish pesetas
Futures 1.1 1.5 1.4 1.1
Exchange-traded options 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.1
Cash market trading 0.6
Outstandings (at year-end) 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3
1  Over-the counter (OTC) activity estimated as average daily turnover in April times 255.  
2  Estimated as OTC trading in
interest rate options on traded securities in Deutsche marks times the ratio of total OTC trading in interest rate options in
Paris or Milan to that in Frankfurt.   
3  Euroclear and Cedel only.  
4  Lira-denominated Treasury bonds only; excludes
floating rate notes.
Sources: Salomon Brothers, Central bank Survey of Foreign Exchange and Derivatives Market Activity 1995, various
futures exchanges, national sources and BIS.19
Table 9
Euro area 10-year government bond futures, early 1999
Transactions Open interest
DE FR ES IT memo: DE FR ES IT memo:
US US
04.01.99 244 17 12 12 91 261 94 13 36 587
05.01.99 312 33 16 11 275 261 93 13 37 585
06.01.99 292 34 16 8 272 293 93 13 36 593
07.01.99 444 28 16 10 373 261 93 13 37 596
08.01.99 422 29 16 11 406 287 93 15 35 601
11.01.99 521 32 19 22 502 312 91 14 36 612
12.01.99 590 35 20 15 403 312 91 15 38 620
13.01.99 791 44 32 23 353 329 91 15 38 608
14.01.99 526 40 30 12 619 369 91 16 41 609
15.01.99 574 43 30 16 484 388 91 17 42 592
18.01.99 188 21 14 6 473 388 91 17 43 604
19.01.99 430 33 20 9 292 391 91 21 43 592
20.01.99 534 36 19 12 289 369 91 21 43 592
21.01.99 433 38 25 9 329 358 91 22 43 574
22.01.99 477 23 20 8 374 351 91 28 43 560
25.01.99 294 20 19 8 379 405 91 29 43 570
26.01.99 427 23 21 9 238 377 91 25 44 585
27.01.99 477 27 20 12 240 406 91 23 45 576
28.01.99 431 22 27 11 305 426 91 23 46 574
29.01.99 290 24 15 5 392 421 92 24 45 585
01.02.99 411 27 14 9 356 379 91 24 45 604
02.02.99 598 53 20 17 334 384 92 25 45 601
03.02.09 623 44 25 14 434 417 89 24 45 602
04.02.99 841 51 33 22 343 447 86 26 45 606
05.02.99 554 43 22 9 558 523 89 26 45 613
08.02.99 557 25 20 15 424 523 89 27 45 631
09.02.99 518 33 24 12 258 512 92 27 45 630
10.02.99 395 37 15 8 330 537 93 23 45 629
11.02.99 413 30 15 9 293 537 92 22 45 616
12.02.99 603 39 31 15 339 537 92 22 46 609
Average 474 33 21 12 359 392 91 21 42 599

















































Belgium       
Netherlands   
Figure 1
In percent per annum
Note:  The yield curves are based on eurodeposit rates and, for longer horizons, on swap (midpoint) yields.
Sources:  Datastream, Reuters and BIS.
Private interest rates in Europe21
Figure 2: Pre-euro structure of euro area government bond market




























Figure 3: Share of euro-area government bond futures turnover23
Figure 4: Post-euro structure of euro area government bond market:
hypothesis of a single futures contract
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Figure 5
Weekly averages, in basis points
Spreads of benchmark government bond yields over that on the German 10-year bond25
Figure 6: Post-euro structure of euro area government bond market:
hypothesis of two credit tiers





Figure 7: Post-euro structure of euro area government bond market:
hypothesis of two credit tiers and multiple issuer deliverability
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